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Continuous Training and Wages – An Empirical 
Analysis Using a Comparison-group Approach
Abstract
Using German linked employer-employee data, this paper investigates the impact of 
on-the-job training on wages. The applied estimation technique was ﬁ  rst introduced 
by Leuven and Oosterbeek (2008). The idea is to compare wages of employees who 
intended to participate in training but did not do so because of a random event with 
wages of training participants. The estimated wage returns are statistically insigniﬁ  -
cant. Furthermore, the decision to participate in training is associated with sizeable 
selection eﬀ  ects. On average, participants have a wage advantage of more than 4% 
compared to non-participants.
JEL Classiﬁ  cation: J24, J31
Keywords: Continuous training; wage returns; selection eﬀ  ect
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Estimating wage returns to on-the-job training is important because it reveals e.g. the potential 
of training to boost labor productivity as hypothesized in the human capital theory (Becker 
1962). Even though a variety of empirical studies were already involved in estimating this 
effect, no final conclusions can be drawn because of ambiguous findings. This ambiguity can 
be explained by the use of different estimation techniques. Average wage differentials 
between training participants and non-participants estimated by standard Mincer-type wage 
equations extended with training measures are quite high (Parent 1999, Loewenstein and 
Spletzer 1999, Goux and Maurin 2000, Muehler et al. 2007). In some studies, they are even 
higher than wage returns to schooling (Schøne 2004). As training courses are often of short 
duration, these estimates appear to be too high to represent the causal effect of training. It is 
rather likely that these wage differentials encompass differences in unobserved characteristics 
between participants and non-participants. 
 
One way to reduce selection bias is to apply individual fixed effects models that control for 
time-invariant omitted variables. Because the application of individual fixed effects produces 
much lower and more credible estimates (Lynch 1992, Pischke 2001, Schøne 2004, Frazis and 
Loewenstein 2005), controlling for unobserved heterogeneity matters when estimating 
training returns. Although these estimates account for time-invariant omitted variable bias, 
they are still biased when training participants and non-participants differ in wage growth 
rates. Evidence in favor of this hypothesis is provided in Pischke (2001) and Frazis and 
Loewenstein (2005). An alternative approach is to use IV or selection models that both 
require an instrument for training participation (Lynch 1992, Parent 1999, Arulampalam and 
Booth 2001, Kuckulenz and Maier 2006). The difficulties with using these models are that 
exclusion restrictions are hard to find and that different instruments can lead to different 
estimates in the case of heterogeneous treatment effects (Ichino and Winter-Ebmer 1999). 
 
Another approach to estimate training returns that neither relies on panel data nor on 
exclusion restrictions was suggested by Leuven and Oosterbeek (2008), henceforth LO. This 
approach defines a group of non-participants that is assumed to have similar characteristics as 
the group of participants. Individuals who intended to participate in one training course but 
did not do so because of a random event are considered an appropriate comparison group to  
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training participants. Cancelling a course because of family circumstances or illness are 
examples of random events. Using Dutch data, the authors find insignificant results for 
participating in one course. This approach was not yet replicated often in the literature 
because it requires specific questions in the questionnaire that are usually not available. 
 
Using an innovative linked-employer-employee training data set, this paper applies the 
comparison-group approach of LO to identify the causal effect of continuous training on 
wages in Germany. The approach is extended in some respects. First, besides providing 
estimates of the impact of participating in one course, a possibility to analyze the impact of 
participating in a second and a third course is presented. This is important as training 
participants often attend more than one course. In addition, the number of courses seems to 
matter for wage growth in Germany (Büchel and Pannenberg 2004). 
 
Second, while the previous literature finds that employees self-select themselves into training, 
there is no information on the size of this selection effect. This will be obtained by comparing 
wages of the group of non-participants that cancelled training plans with wages of the group 
of non-participants that had no training intentions. Since both groups did not participate in 
training, a resulting wage difference has to be ascribed to initial differences in unobservables. 
Third, employer characteristics will be controlled, in particular, by applying firm fixed 
effects. Despite the fact that the majority of studies account for at least some firm attributes 
such as size or industry, only few have access to more detailed information to account for a 
larger set of firm attributes. However, it was shown that controlling for a broader set of firm 
attributes can change the results substantially (Goux and Maurin 2000).  
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next two sections present the linked employer-
employee data in detail and the empirical strategy. Section 4 provides the regression results 




The analysis is based on the German linked employer-employee data set “WeLL” that was 
particularly designed to analyze further training activities of individuals. The first wave of the 
data is used covering 6,404 employees who were employed in December 31, 2006 in one of  
6 
 
149 establishments that were selected for the survey.
1 The following selection criteria applied. 
Establishments with more than 100 and fewer than 2000 employees that operate in the 
manufacturing or service sector were considered. This sampling frame of interviewing many 
workers out of a limited number of firms has the advantage that firm fixed effects can be 
applied, i.e. the firm-specific environment can be kept constant when analyzing training 
processes. The employees were interviewed via telephone from October 2007 to January 
2008. With respect to training, individuals were asked whether they have participated in 
training during the last two years, i.e. from January 2006 to the time of the interview. Even 
though the data also contains questions on less formal learning activities (such as attending 
conferences or instructions by colleague), this study focuses on “class-room” training like 
courses, seminars or lectures.
2 
 
One feature of the data is that wages can be merged from administrative sources of the social 
security system if respondents gave their permission which applied to more than 90%. Fewer 
than 10% who did not agree on merging were asked about their current wages in the 
questionnaire. Due to this procedure, there are only few respondents with missing information 
on gross monthly wages. Using data from administrative sources has the advantage that wages 
are unaffected by measurement error. The disadvantage is that wages taken from the social 
security system are right censored in Germany because they are only reported up to the 
contribution limit. This is why methods accounting for censored data have to be applied in the 
empirical strategy. 
 
For the analysis, some data restrictions were made. First, individuals who are unemployed or 
nonemployed during the time of the interview are deleted which is the case for 3% of 
observations in the sample. Second, observations with missing information on wages are also 
excluded which applied to 2% of the initial sample. Furthermore, observations with monthly 
wages of less than 500 Euros and with more than 20,000 Euros are excluded as well. While 
the latter restriction eliminates very few outliers, the former reduces the sample by less than 
2% which was necessary to delete marginally employed who might exhibit different training 
patterns and processes. Last, only observations with no item nonresponse on core variables 
are incorporated which decreased the sample size by another 2%.  The final sample is 
                                                 
1 In the following, no distinction between firms and establishments will be made; both are referred to as firms.   
2 See Bender et al. (2009) for further information on the data set.  
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composed of 5829 persons. A definition of variables and sample means is presented in the 
Appendix Table A-1. 
 
3. Empirical Method 
 
The idea of the approach of LO is to narrow down the comparison group of non-participants 
into a sub-group that is similar to the group of training participants. This is assumed to be the 
case for persons who intended to participate in training but cancelled due to some random 
event (also referred to as would-be participants in the following).
3 The identifying assumption 
is that the characteristics of would-be participants and training participants are identical. The 
treatment effect on the treated is obtained by comparing wages of these two groups 
conditional on control variables.  
 
In the WeLL data, the question to identify would-be participants is: “Did you intend to 
participate in training courses, seminars or lectures in the last two years without realizing this 
plan?” It is crucial that the reasons for non-participation are random because otherwise 
selection bias could contaminate the results. Employees cancelling a course because of high 
training costs are probably not comparable to training participants. Therefore, respondents 
were asked for the reasons of cancelling their plans. When reporting that the course was 
cancelled by the organizer or when reporting family or health reasons or reasons related to the 
job (high work load), this is regarded as random in the following. 
 
Of course, one can argue that these reasons are not random. In particular, it could be shown 
that health has an impact on wages in Germany (Jäckle and Himmler 2010). This is why the 
results of this paper are only unbiased, if health reasons refer to transient rather than to 
permanent and serious health shocks. This seems to be the case as sensitivity checks 
excluding health as exogenous event show that the main results remain unchanged. Although 
the most convincing exogenous reason, cancelled by the organizer, was reported frequently, it 
was not reported frequently enough to define the comparison group only on the basis of this 
                                                 
3 The approach is similar to using no-shows or early program dropouts as comparison group in the literature of 
program evaluation (see e.g. Bell et al. 1995). The difference is that LO distinguish the reasons for non-
participation. They show that only those persons who cancelled because of an exogeneous reason are an 




4 Having said this, a test for balancing the characteristics of would-be participants 
and training participants shows that observables are similar. This indicates that the random 
events chosen for this paper are appropriate.
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While LO focus on the impact of participating in one training course, a way to analyze the 
wage impact of the second and third course is suggested and implemented in this paper. This 
is done by defining separate treatment and comparison groups for participating in one course, 
for the second and for the third course. The reason why this can be done is that the question 
on cancelling courses is not only posed to non-participants in the WeLL data but also to 
participants. An additional extension of the model of LO is to determine the “selection effect 
of the training decision” which measures differences in unobservable characteristics between 
training participants and non-participants. These unobservable characteristics could represent, 
for example, the return to innate ability or motivation.  
 
In the WeLL data, nine groups of training participants are classified according to employees’ 
training attendance and intentions (see Table 1). There are 5,829 employees in the sample, of 
whom 1,809 are non-participants with no training intentions (31%). There are 150 non-
participants having training intentions (3%) and 1,603 persons having participated in exactly 
one course (28%). To evaluate the impact of the first training course, wages of these two 
groups are compared. For the effect of the second course, wages of 185 persons who attended 
one course and cancelled a second one (3%) are compared with wages of 881 persons who 
participated in exactly two courses (15%). 170 persons with two courses and intentions for a 
third one (3%) are compared with 377 persons attending three courses (6%). The remaining 
two groups (i.e. 467 persons with more than three courses, 187 cancelling due to non-random 
reasons) are not used for identification of the effect.  
 
                                                 
4 Cancelled by the organizer and job-related reasons are reported most often (both in the same magnitude). A 
fewer number of persons indicated family or health reasons. 
5 When using all reasons including non-random reasons to define the comparison group, the balancing test shows 
that they are also similar to the treatment group in terms of observable characteristics. However, the comparison 
group defined on the basis of random events is even more similar and will, therefore, be in the focus of this 
paper.   
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Table 1: Training attendance of employees within the last 2 years 
Training Group Obs.
No training participation (tr1) 1,809
No training participation, but intended to participate in one course (tr2) 150
Training participation in only one course (tr3) 1,603
Training participation in only one course and intended to participate in a second course (tr4) 185
Training participation in exactly two courses (tr5) 881
Training participation in two courses and intended to participate in a third course (tr6) 170
Training participation in exactly three courses (tr7) 377
Training participation in more than three courses or intended to do fourth course (tr8) 467
Employees cancelling training plans due to non-random reasons (regardless of actual participation) (tr9) 187
Total  5,829 
 
The empirical strategy is implemented as follows:  
0 ln( ) ' 2...9
K
ij ijk k ij j ij
k
wage tr X with k αβ γ α ε =+ + ++ =   
where ln(wage) represents log gross monthly wage of individual i employed in establishment 
j. The dummy variables trk represent the nine training groups that were already described in 
Table 1 (tr1 serves as the base group). The reason for considering all training groups in a joint 
regression rather than running separate regressions is to increase the size of the sample. The 
variables of interest are tr3-tr2 for participating in one course, tr5-tr4 for the second course and 
tr7-tr6  for the third course. Whether these deviations differ from zero on a statistically 
significant level is tested by an F-test. The selection effect of the training decision is revealed 
by the coefficient on tr2. The vector X contains control variables including socio-
demographic, occupational and job characteristics. A complete list of characteristics is 
provided in the Appendix Table A-1.  
 
The establishment-specific time-invariant effect is captured by αj which is necessary to avoid 
biased results, for instance, if firms that sponsor training also pay higher wages. This could be 
the case, for example, for firms with a higher degree of technology use and better 
technological equipment or with more complex working tasks. It is also plausible that firm 
effects correlate with the probability to cancel training intentions, especially in the case of 
job-related reasons. A prerequisite when applying firm fixed effects is that for every firm 
more than one employee is observed; otherwise these observations are not used for 
identification. This is very unlikely to hold for movers who leave their firm and start a job in a  
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new firm. As movers might differ in terms of training and wage patterns, excluding them from 
the sample might induce a sample selection bias. To tackle this problem, an identical firm 
fixed effect is generated for the 105 movers in the data, i.e. they are treated as if all of them 
switched to the same firm.
6 
 
Because of the fact that wages are right-censored in the data, implementing OLS would 
produce biased estimates. To address the censoring issue, two approaches are applied. First, 
wages are imputed as suggested in Gartner (2005). These imputed wages enter the OLS 
regression framework as dependent variable. Second, a Tobit model using the social security 
contribution limit of wages as right-censoring point is estimated.
7 Unlike Probit models, 
introducing fixed effects as slope coefficients along with covariates does not lead to biased 
coefficients in the Tobit model (Greene 2004). Instead the fixed effects Tobit model has 
inflated marginal effects and downward biased standard errors that both improve when the 
number of observations per fixed effect increases. In the WeLL data, the average number of 
employees per firm fixed effect is 39 which I consider as sufficiently large to apply the Tobit 
fixed effects model. Using two approaches to account for censoring has the advantage of 
checking the robustness of the results.  
 
The crucial assumption for identification is that characteristics between treatment and 
comparison group are similar. This can only be tested empirically for differences in 
observable characteristics while there is no test for differences in unobservables. Besides the 
variables that enter the regression as covariates, log wages previous to the reference period of 
the training questions can also be compared for persons who permitted merging 
administrative data. If there are differences in unobservable characteristics that cannot be 
included in the balancing, they should be reflected by past wage differentials. In addition, this 
also tests directly whether there are differences in past wage growth rates between treatment 
and comparison groups as suggested by Pischke (2001). Therefore, no differences in past 
wages are seen as an important prerequisite to obtain unbiased estimates. The balancing tests 
between treatment and comparison groups are presented in Table 2. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Thanks to Petra Todd for this suggestion. 
7 Since the limits differ by West and East Germany, the lower of the two (i.e. the East German limit) is used as 
upper limit for the whole sample. By doing so, 20% of all observations are treated as censored.   
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When comparing characteristics of participants in one course with their comparison group 
(column 1), there are no statistically significant differences with the exception of age. Column 
2 documents results for treatment and comparison group of attending a second course. Age 
and children differ significantly and, most importantly, there are significant differences in log 
wages in 2005. This suggests that treatment and comparison groups are not as equal as 
necessary for identifying unbiased estimates. In column 3, age is significantly smaller and the 
percentage of white collar workers is significantly larger in the comparison group. None of 
the other characteristics differ on a statistically significant level. In conclusion, while 
treatment and comparison group for the first and third course match well, there is weaker 
evidence for the second course. 
 
Table 2: Balancing between treatment and comparison groups 
tr3 tr2 Δtr3-tr2 tr5 tr4 Δtr5-tr4 tr7 tr6 Δtr7-tr6
Male 0.66 0.67 -0.01 -0.27 0.65 0.67 -0.02 -0.61 0.58 0.62 -0.04 -0.94
German 0.96 0.96 0.00 -0.18 0.96 0.94 0.03 1.36 0.97 0.95 0.02 0.82
Age 45.47 43.61 1.85 2.47 ** 44.65 43.42 1.24 1.77 * 44.10 42.61 1.49 1.79 *
Married 0.75 0.74 0.01 0.18 0.74 0.74 0.00 0.08 0.67 0.67 0.00 -0.11
Child 0.39 0.41 -0.03 -0.60 0.37 0.48 -0.11 -2.67 *** 0.37 0.39 -0.03 -0.56
Years of schooling 13.02 12.74 0.28 1.43 13.40 13.67 -0.27 -1.27 13.89 14.11 -0.22 -0.92
Tenure 217.51 202.52 14.99 1.39 204.81 194.40 10.41 1.02 194.77 179.79 14.98 1.25
White collar employee 0.66 0.62 0.04 0.89 0.76 0.82 -0.05 -1.64 0.84 0.89 -0.05 -1.68 *
Full time job 0.86 0.84 0.02 0.69 0.85 0.88 -0.03 -0.94 0.86 0.85 0.01 0.37
Temporary contract 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.40 0.03 0.05 -0.01 -0.86 0.05 0.09 -0.04 -1.54
Observations
Log monthly wage 2005 7.92 7.93 -0.01 -0.31 7.96 8.03 -0.07 -1.86 * 8.02 8.03 -0.01 -0.20
Observations
Log monthly wage 2004 7.91 7.92 -0.01 -0.31 7.96 8.01 -0.05 -1.32 8.01 8.02 -0.01 -0.22
Observations
Log monthly wage 2003 7.90 7.89 0.01 0.20 7.95 7.96 -0.02 -0.31 7.99 8.02 -0.03 -0.67
Observations
Notes: The t-test for independent samples is used. Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
t-value t-value
Employees with three courses (tr7) 
versus those with two courses willing 
to attend another (tr6)
(3)
Employees with one course
(tr3) versus those willing to attend one 
course (tr2)
(1)
Employees with two courses (tr5) 










For reason of comparison, differences in average characteristics between the comparison 
groups and the group of non-participants (tr1) are displayed in Table 3. These differences are 
much more pronounced than differences between treatment and comparison group. Most 
importantly, the groups differ in previous wages as well as in years of education. The 
educational background is of particular importance because it is closely linked to 
unobservable characteristics such as ability. Non-participants who had no training intentions 




Table 3: Comparison of average characteristics between non-participants and comparison group 
tr2 tr1 Δtr2-tr1 tr4 tr1 Δtr4-tr1 tr6 tr1 Δtr6-tr1
Male 0.67 0.65 0.02 0.55 0.67 0.65 0.02 0.52 0.62 0.65 -0.03 -0.71
German 0.96 0.91 0.05 2.73 *** 0.94 0.91 0.02 1.16 0.95 0.91 0.04 2.29 **
Age 43.61 46.58 -2.97 -3.97 *** 43.42 46.58 -3.16 -4.77 *** 42.61 46.58 -3.97 -5.63 ***
Married 0.74 0.73 0.01 0.20 0.74 0.73 0.01 0.24 0.67 0.73 -0.06 -1.64
Child 0.41 0.32 0.09 2.23 ** 0.48 0.32 0.16 4.19 *** 0.39 0.32 0.07 1.89 **
Years of schooling 12.74 12.11 0.63 3.26 *** 13.67 12.11 1.56 7.66 *** 14.11 12.11 2.00 9.38 ***
Tenure 202.52 223.10 -20.58 -1.91 * 194.40 223.10 -28.70 -2.93 *** 179.79 223.10 -43.30 -4.18 ***
White collar employee 0.62 0.43 0.19 4.66 *** 0.82 0.43 0.39 12.63 *** 0.89 0.43 0.47 17.72 ***
Full time job 0.84 0.86 -0.02 -0.54 0.88 0.86 0.02 0.73 0.85 0.86 -0.01 -0.34
Temporary contract 0.04 0.06 -0.02 -1.13 0.05 0.06 -0.01 -0.62 0.09 0.06 0.03 1.29
Observations
Log monthly wage 2005 7.93 7.80 0.13 3.73 *** 8.03 7.80 0.23 6.31 *** 8.03 7.80 0.23 6.22 ***
Observations
Log monthly wage 2004 7.92 7.79 0.13 3.58 *** 8.01 7.79 0.22 5.87 *** 8.02 7.79 0.23 5.61 ***
Observations
Log monthly wage 2003 7.89 7.79 0.10 2.57 ** 7.96 7.79 0.17 3.42 *** 8.02 7.79 0.23 5.79 ***
Observations
Non-participants (tr1) versus those with 
two courses willing to attend another 
course (tr6)
(3)
Non-participants (tr1) versus 
those willing to attend 
one course (tr2)
(1) 
Non-participants (tr1) versus those with 













4. Results  
 
The regression results without controlling for firm fixed effects are displayed in Table 4 (for 
full regression results including all control covariates see Table A-2 in the Appendix). The 
first column presents OLS results for imputed wages and the second column presents Tobit 
fixed effects results. In both models, an implausible pattern emerges as would-be participants 
have larger wages than actual participants (even though the differences are not statistically 
significant). When accounting for firm fixed effects (Table 5, see Table A-3 for full 
regression results), however, the pattern is reversed. This indicates that accounting for firm 
fixed effects is important.  
 
In both column 1 and column 2 of Table 5, the effect for participating in one course is 0.5% 
(tr3-tr2). The impact of the second course is much higher with 2.2% (tr5-tr4) and it ranges from 
-1.8% to -2.4% for the third course. Even if none of these differences are statistically 
significant, a discussion of the size of the effects is nevertheless warranted to assess the 
credibility of the results. In the WeLL data, the average hours spent per training course is 
approximately 38. While a return of 0.5% could be interpreted as plausible for participating in 




8 This conclusion is in accordance with the results of the balancing test 
showing that the identification assumption for the second course does not hold anyway.  
 
For the third course, the point estimate has a negative sign which is possible from a theoretical 
point of view if workers contribute to firms’ training costs by accepting lower wages during 
the training period.
9 However, an approximate wage reduction of 2% is huge. In addition, the 
estimate is not very robust when using different estimation models (as is also shown in the 
sensitivity analysis below). Therefore, I do not believe that the effect of the third course 
represents a causal effect.  
 
Table 4: Regression results without applying firm fixed effects, dependent variable: log monthly wage 
Regressors
Stand. Err. Stand. Err.
No training participation, tr1
No training participation, but intended, tr2 0.079 *** 0.025 0.073 *** 0.025
Training participation in only one course, tr3 0.050 *** 0.013 0.044 *** 0.014
Training participation in one course, but intended to do another, tr4 0.116 *** 0.027 0.102 *** 0.030
Training participation in exactly two courses, tr5 0.095 *** 0.017 0.086 *** 0.019
Training participation in two courses, but intended to do another, tr6 0.167 *** 0.027 0.149 *** 0.028
Training participation in exactly three courses, tr7 0.128 *** 0.021 0.117 *** 0.022
Training participation in more than three (intended) courses, tr8 0.166 *** 0.024 0.155 *** 0.027
Training intention cancelled due to non-random reason, tr9 0.087 *** 0.025 0.072 *** 0.026
Individual charact.
Firm fixed effects
F-test for tr2=tr3, (p-value)
F-test for tr4=tr5, (p-value)





Notes: OLS regression results using imputed wages are shown in column 1. Column 2 contains uncoditional marginal 
effects of a Tobit regression (1143 right-censored observations). Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level. 
The control variables include male, German, age and age squared, married, child, an interaction term of male and child, 
years of schooling, tenure and tenure squared,  white collar employee, full time job and temporary contract. Full estimation 


























                                                 
8 The return for a year of schooling ranges from 5% to 12% in Germany (Ichino and Winter-Ebmer 1999). 
9 In the WeLL data, the vast majority of courses is at least co-financed by employers. In many European 
countries, employers bear a substantial share of training costs (Bassanini et al. 2007).   
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Table 5: Regression results after controlling for firm fixed effects, dependent variable: log monthly wage 
Regressors
Stand. Err. Stand. Err.
No training participation, tr1
No training participation, but intended, tr2 0.046 ** 0.021 0.042 ** 0.022
Training participation in only one course, tr3 0.050 *** 0.010 0.047 *** 0.010
Training participation in one course, but intended to do another, tr4 0.058 *** 0.019 0.056 *** 0.023
Training participation in exactly two courses, tr5 0.080 *** 0.014 0.078 *** 0.015
Training participation in two courses, but intended to do another, tr6 0.125 *** 0.021 0.118 *** 0.022
Training participation in exactly three courses, tr7 0.102 *** 0.015 0.100 *** 0.015
Training participation in more than three (intended) courses, tr8 0.164 *** 0.019 0.162 *** 0.021
Training intention cancelled due to non-random reason, tr9 0.069 *** 0.018 0.063 *** 0.019
Individual charact.
Firm fixed effects
F-test for tr2=tr3, (p-value)
F-test for tr4=tr5, (p-value)





Log pseudolikelihood --- -639.54
Notes: OLS regression results using imputed wages are shown in column 1. Column 2 contains uncoditional marginal 
effects of a Tobit regression (1143 right-censored observations). Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level. 
The control variables include male, German, age and age squared, married, child, an interaction term of male and child, 
years of schooling, tenure and tenure squared,  white collar employee, full time job and temporary contract. Full estimation 




1.27, (0.26) 0.73, (0.39)
5,829 5,829
0.06, (0.81) 0.06, (0.81)




Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff.
Base category Base category
 
 
The reason for unstable or unreliable effects for the second and third course is not obvious. 
One problem for those with multiple courses could be rooted in the question on training 
intentions itself because it cannot be ruled out that cancelled courses were postponed. In this 
case, some would-be participants are misclassified and should actually be assigned to the 
treatment group which would be an explanation for the high point estimate of the second 
course. Recall bias concerning course cancellation might also be a more severe problem when 
the number of attended courses increases. Thus, when extending the approach of LO to 
multiple training courses, it might be necessary to improve the questions for participants in 
multiple courses. For example, it could be emphasized that postponed courses should not be 
reported. Also, using more detailed questions on training intentions or a shorter time period 
than two years could reduce recall bias. The latter comes with the disadvantage, though, that 




Concerning the selection effect of training participation, non-participants with no training 
intentions have a significantly higher average wage of 4.2% to 4.6% compared to non-
participants with no intentions. To interpret the size of this coefficient, naïve OLS estimates 
are provided in Table A-4 in the Appendix where log wages are regressed on a binary training 
indicator in addition to socio-demographic and job characteristics. On average, training 
participants have 7.3% higher wages compared to non-participants. The selection bias 
accounts for more than 50% of this average difference. The remaining part does not only 
reflect the average return to the average participant, it also contains the selection effect of 
choosing the number of courses, i.e. persons participating in one course could again have 
different unobservables than persons participating in two courses and so on. Even though it 
would be of interest, the size of this effect cannot be investigated in this paper. Technically, 
this would be possible by comparing tr4 with tr3 for the selection effect of participating in a 
second course (compared to one course only) and tr6 with tr5 for the selection effect of 
participating in a third course (compared to two courses) if tr4-tr7 represent causal effects.  
 
To check the robustness of the results, a variety of sensitivity analysis were undertaken using 
Tobit regressions. In particular, excluding health reasons as random event, using flexible 
functional forms for age and tenure, controlling for the interviewer date and for self-reported 
wages versus administrative wages leaves the main conclusions unchanged. The selection 
effect ranges between 4.3% and 4.8% and it is always statistically significant. The training 
effects are statistically insignificant and have a point estimate of 0.1% to 0.6% for the first 
course, 1.8% to 2.4% for the second course and -1.6% to -2.6% for the third course.  
 
As an additional sensitivity check, wages of treatment and comparison group for the first, 
second and third course, respectively, are compared in separate regressions. This is equivalent 
to the empirical implementation of LO.
10 When estimating the selection effect of the training 
decision by considering tr1 and tr2 in one regression, the effect is 5.0% on a statistical 
significant level. For one course, the point estimate increases to 1.0% but remains statistically 
insignificant. The estimate for the second course is 2.8% and -0.9% for the third course, both 
are not significant. This is very similar to the main results.  
 
                                                 
10 For this sensitivity check, imputed wages are used because sample sizes are to small for applying Tobit models 
with fixed effects.   
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The rather small sample sizes of would-be participants, could cause problems with statistical 
significance as they might simply be too small to reject the null hypothesis of a zero effect. 
Running simulations reveal that even when the sample sizes were increased to a conventional 
size, e.g. by a factor of five, none of the training effects would become statistically 
significant. Therefore, insignificant results for one, the second and third course are not caused 
by small sample sizes. However, it should be noted that a small coefficient of 0.5% would 




This paper investigates wage returns to training in Germany by using a comparison-group 
approach that was suggested by LO. One of the main results of the paper is that the returns to 
participating in one training course is statistically insignificant and has a point estimate of 
approximately 0.5%. Zero or small returns to training to individuals could arise, if employers 
who pay most of the costs of training also appropriate most of the monetary returns. This 
result of insignificant returns to participating in one course was also found in LO.  
 
However, I cannot conclude that firms do not share any of the training returns with their 
employees based on estimates for the first course only. This would ignore that training 
participants attend courses frequently and that training returns are a function of the number of 
courses in Germany. In addition, such a conclusion would also contradict the literature 
comparing productivity and wage returns to training using firm data (Dearden et al. 2006, 
Groot 1999, Conti 2005, Ballot et al. 2006, Kuckulenz 2006, Konings and Vanormelingen 
2009). In almost every of these papers, positive and significant wage effects of training are 
found. However, it is also found that firms do keep a larger share of the returns to themselves, 
in particular, productivity growth exceeds wage growth by 2-5 times.  
 
Another insight is that the group of non-participants is heterogeneous. They differ in terms of 
their socio-demographic and job characteristics and in terms of their wages. Would-be 
participants have a wage advantage of 4% to 5% compared to non-participants with no 
training intentions. Therefore, average wage differentials of training participants and non-
participants after controlling for some covariates (obtained by naïve OLS estimates) reflect to  
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Table A-1: Variable description and summary statistics 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. 
ln(wage) Logarithm of gross monthly wages 7.95 0.43
Male Dummy variable: 1 for males, 0 otherwise 0.64 0.48
German Dummy variable: 1 for born in Germany, 0 otherwise 0.94 0.23
Age Age in years 45.18 9.34
Age squared Age in years squared 2128.54 814.73
Married Dummy variable: 1 for married employees, 0 otherwise 0.73 0.44
Child Dummy variable: 1 for employees with underaged children, 0 otherwise 0.37 0.48
Male*Child Interaction term between male and child 0.25 0.43
Years of schooling Years of schooling 13.00 2.44
Tenure Tenure in current job (in months) 209.65 136.74
Tenure squared Tenure in current job (in months) squared  62646.23 67641.28
White collar employee Dummy variable: 1 for white collar workers, 0 otherwise 0.65 0.48
Full time job Dummy variable: 1 for employees working full-time, 0 otherwise 0.86 0.35
Temporary contract Dummy variable: 1 for employees with temporary contract, 0 otherwise 0.05 0.22
Notes: 5,829 observations.   
 
Table A-2: Full regression results without applying firm fixed effects, dep. variable: log monthly wage 
Regressors
Stand. Err. Stand. Err.
No training participation, tr1
No training participation, but intended, tr2 0.079 *** 0.025 0.073 *** 0.025
Training participation in only one course, tr3 0.050 *** 0.013 0.044 *** 0.014
Training participation in one course, but intended to do another, tr4 0.116 *** 0.027 0.102 *** 0.030
Training participation in exactly two courses, tr5 0.095 *** 0.017 0.086 *** 0.019
Training participation in two courses, but intended to do another, tr6 0.167 *** 0.027 0.149 *** 0.028
Training participation in exactly three courses, tr7 0.128 *** 0.021 0.117 *** 0.022
Training participation in more than three (intended) courses, tr8 0.166 *** 0.024 0.155 *** 0.027
Training intention cancelled due to non-random reason, tr9 0.087 *** 0.025 0.072 *** 0.026
Male 0.243 *** 0.0244 0.219 *** 0.025
German -0.011 0.0196 -0.013 0.021
Age 0.019 *** 0.0056 0.017 *** 0.006
Age squared -0.0002 *** 0.0001 -0.0002 *** 0.000
Married -0.006 0.0110 -0.008 0.012
Child -0.053 ** 0.0248 -0.050 ** 0.025
Male*Child 0.140 *** 0.0265 0.126 *** 0.028
Years of schooling 0.054 *** 0.0040 0.048 *** 0.004
Tenure 0.001 *** 0.0002 0.001 *** 0.000
Tenure square 0.000 0.0000 0.000 0.000
White collar employee 0.212 *** 0.0224 0.191 *** 0.023
Full time job 0.480 *** 0.0276 0.432 *** 0.028
Temporary contract -0.082 *** 0.0262 -0.068 *** 0.028
Firm fixed effects
Observations
Notes: OLS regression results using imputed wages are shown in column 1. Column 2 contains uncoditional marginal 
effects of a Tobit regression (1143 right- censored observations). Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level. 













Table A-3: Full regression results after controlling for firm fixed effects, dep. variable: log monthly wage 
Regressors
Stand. Err. Stand. Err.
No training participation, tr1
No training participation, but intended, tr2 0.046 ** 0.021 0.042 ** 0.022
Training participation in only one course, tr3 0.050 *** 0.010 0.047 *** 0.010
Training participation in one course, but intended to do another, tr4 0.058 *** 0.019 0.056 *** 0.023
Training participation in exactly two courses, tr5 0.080 *** 0.014 0.078 *** 0.015
Training participation in two courses, but intended to do another, tr6 0.125 *** 0.021 0.118 *** 0.022
Training participation in exactly three courses, tr7 0.102 *** 0.015 0.100 *** 0.015
Training participation in more than three (intended) courses, tr8 0.164 *** 0.019 0.162 *** 0.021
Training intention cancelled due to non-random reason, tr9 0.069 *** 0.018 0.063 *** 0.019
Male 0.156 *** 0.0130 0.146 *** 0.0135
German 0.066 *** 0.0208 0.056 *** 0.0181
Age 0.024 *** 0.0045 0.023 *** 0.0048
Age squared -0.0002 *** 0.0000 -0.0002 *** 0.0001
Married 0.004 0.0084 0.002 0.0087
Child -0.081 *** 0.0224 -0.080 *** 0.0222
Male*Child 0.124 *** 0.0243 0.120 *** 0.0248
Years of schooling 0.051 *** 0.0028 0.047 *** 0.0030
Tenure 0.000 0.0002 0.000 * 0.0002
Tenure square 0.000 0.0000 0.000 0.0000
White collar employee 0.196 *** 0.0135 0.192 *** 0.0139
Full time job 0.477 *** 0.0278 0.452 *** 0.0279
Temporary contract -0.069 *** 0.0198 -0.065 *** 0.0209
Firm fixed effects
Observations
Notes: OLS regression results using imputed wages are shown in column 1. Column 2 contains uncoditional marginal 
effects of a Tobit regression (1143 right- censored observations). Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level. 




Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff.
Base category Base category
 
 
Table A-4: Regression results not accounting for endogeneity 
Regressors
Stand. Err.
Training participation (yes/no) 0.073 *** 0.015
Male 0.217 *** 0.026
German -0.014 0.022
Age 0.017 *** 0.006
Age squared 0.000 *** 0.000
Married -0.010 0.012
Child -0.050 ** 0.025
Male*Child 0.127 *** 0.028
Years of schooling 0.049 *** 0.004
Tenure 0.001 ** 0.000
Tenure square 0.000 0.000
White collar employee 0.202 *** 0.023
Full time job 0.433 *** 0.029




Notes: Tobit results are shown (1143 right-censored observations). Standard errors 
are clustered at the establishment level. Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Log monthly wage
Coeff.
No
5,829
0.51
 